

## Equilibrium at the Producer's Level in the Measurable Uncertainty

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*The paper presents the essential aspects concerning the equilibrium at the producer's level in the measurable uncertainty. As a result, the selling price under uncertainty can be expressed as a function of the price under certainty, and thus is obtained the program and the equation which lead to the solution, in all the situations presented.*

**Keywords:** risk, measurable uncertainty, unmeasurable uncertainty, selling price.

**T**he dichotomy between risk and uncertainty was first presented by F.H. Knight in 1921, as it follows:

- *The risk* represents the *measurable uncertainty*, that is the evolution of a phenomenon is influenced by the probabilities for different states of the nature (in this case, the situation is known as *the risky situation*);
- *The unmeasurable uncertainty* represents the opposite case (the situation is known as the *uncertain situation*).

We will present in the following a producer, for which we know:

- The quantity produced and offered by the producer,  $q$ ;
- $p_0$  - the selling price under certainty environment;
- $C(q)$  - the variable cost;
- $CF$  - the fix cost;
- $\Pi$  - the payoff;

The payoff under the certainty environment, at the producer's level will be:

$$\Pi = p_0 q - C(q) - CF.$$

We will assume that the market price is uncertain and that its distribution is given by the lottery:

$$\tilde{p} = L(\underline{p}, \bar{p}; \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}), \quad \text{cu} \quad \underline{p} < p_0 < \bar{p} \quad \text{si}$$

$$E(\tilde{p}) = \frac{1}{2}(\underline{p}) + \frac{1}{2}(\bar{p}) = p_0$$

As a result, the selling price for the uncertainty case can be expressed as a function of the price under certainty:

$$\tilde{p} = p_0 + \tilde{y}, \quad \text{cu} \quad \tilde{y} = L(\underline{p} + p_0, \bar{p} - p_0; \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$$

si  $E(\tilde{y}) = 0$  ( $\tilde{y}$  is a normal lottery with fair probability)

The optimum quantity which a producer can offer results from solving the optimum problem:

$$[\max]_q EU(\tilde{\Pi} + w_0) = EU(\tilde{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0),$$

where:  $\tilde{\Pi}$  - is the random payoff;  $w_0$  - is the initial endowment;

$$\text{But: } EU(\tilde{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0) =$$

$$\frac{1}{2}U(\underline{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0) + \frac{1}{2}U(\bar{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0)$$

and so:

$$EU(\tilde{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0) = \frac{1}{2}U(\underline{w}) + \frac{1}{2}U(\bar{w});$$

The first order condition leads to:

$$\begin{aligned} EU[(\tilde{p} - C'(q))U'(\tilde{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0)] &= \\ &= \frac{1}{2}(\underline{p} - C'(q))U'(\underline{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0) + \\ &+ \frac{1}{2}(\bar{p} - C'(q))U'(\bar{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0) = 0 \end{aligned}$$

From  $U'(\bullet) > 0$  and  $E(\bullet) = 0$  results that  $\underline{p} \leq C'(q) \leq \bar{p}$ .

We will make the following notation:

$q^{**}$  - the optimum quantity produced by the firm under uncertainty, at the price  $\tilde{p}$ ;

$q^*$  - the optimum quantity produced by the firm under certainty at the price  $p_0$ ;

$\underline{q}^*$  - the optimum quantity produced by the firm under certainty at the price  $\underline{p}$ ;

$\bar{q}^*$  - the optimum quantity produced by the firm under certainty, at the price  $\bar{p}$ ;

As a result, we have the following table which presents the program and the equation which leads to the solution, in any situation:

**Table 1.**

Price	Quantity	The program	The equation
$p_0$	$q^*$	$[\max]_q \{ p_0 q - C(q) - CF \}$	$C'(q) = p_0$
$\tilde{p}$	$q^{**}$	$[\max]_q EU(\tilde{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0)$	$\frac{1}{2}(\underline{p} - C'(q))U'(\underline{w}) + \frac{1}{2}(\bar{p} - C'(q))U'(\bar{w}) = 0$
$\underline{p}$	$\underline{q}^*$	$[\max]_q \{ p_0 q - C(q) - CF \}$	$C'(q) = \underline{p}$
$\bar{p}$	$\bar{q}^*$	$[\max]_q \{ p_0 q - C(q) - CF \}$	$C'(q) = \bar{p}$

**Example 1.** We consider a firm which can produce, from technical point of view, a maximum number of 150 units, for which we have.

$w_0 = 50.000$  u.m. (euro)

$CF = 3.000$  u.m. (euro)

$$C(q) = \begin{cases} 250q, & \text{daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ 400q - 10500, & \text{daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

- the firm procedure is completely guided by the utility function  $U(w) = \sqrt{w}$ ;

- under certainty, the firm will sell at the price  $p_0 = 300$  euro;

- under uncertainty, the selling price will be  $\underline{p} = 100$  euro and  $\bar{p} = 500$  euro, with equal probabilities.

We look for the optimum quantity produced by the firm in the next situations:

- a) there is no uncertainty on the price;
- b) there are 2 bounded cases in the certain future,  $\underline{p}$  and  $\bar{p}$ ;
- c) there is uncertainty on the price.

*Solution:*

a) From the optimum problem:

$$[\max]_q \Pi = p_0 q - C(q) - CF$$

applying the optimum necessary condition we get  $\frac{d\Pi}{dq} = 0$  which leads to

$$p_0 - C'(q) = 300 - C'(q) = \begin{cases} 250, & \text{daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ 400, & \text{daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

$$= \begin{cases} 50, & \text{daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ -100, & \text{daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

**Observation:** For a quantity between 0 and 70 units, the marginal payoff is positive (50 euro for each unit), which leads to a growth in the obtained quantity till the 70 units, because one unit extra (the 71 unit) will lead to a 100 euro loss. Consequently, the optimum quantity will be of 70 units,  $q^* = 70$ , which leads to a payoff of  $70 \times 300 - 70 \times 250 - 3000 = 500$  euro.

b) We study each case:

• For  $\underline{p} = 100$  euro, the optimum problem is:

$$[\max]_q \Pi = \underline{p}q - C(q) - CF$$

The necessary optimum condition is:

$$\frac{d\Pi}{dq} = 0$$

$$\underline{p} - C'(q) = 100 - \begin{cases} 250, & \text{daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ 400, & \text{daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

$$= \begin{cases} -150, & \text{daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ -300, & \text{daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

In this case, as we can see, every unit of goods, if would be produced, would automatically lead to losses.

So, the firm will take the decision not to produce:  $q^* = 0$ , and the payoff will actually be a loss of 3000 euro, because of the fix cost.

• for  $\bar{p} = 500$  euro we'll have, as before:

$$[\max]_q \Pi = \bar{p}q - C(q) - CF$$

CNO:  $\frac{d\Pi}{dq} = 0$ , this leads to

$$\bar{p} - C'(q) = 500 - \begin{cases} 250, \text{ daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ 400, \text{ daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

$$= \begin{cases} 250, \text{ daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ 100, \text{ daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

We can see that the marginal payoff is positive on the both branches, so we can get  $\bar{q}^* = 150$  units (each extra unit produced till 150 will bring a payoff).

The payoff will be of:  $150 \cdot 500 - 400 \cdot 150 + 10500 - 3000 = 22500$  euro.

$$\begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{100 - 250}{2\sqrt{100q - 250q + 47000}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{500 - 250}{2\sqrt{500q - 250q + 47000}} \right) = 0, \text{ daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{100 - 400}{2\sqrt{100q - 400q + 57500}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{500 - 400}{2\sqrt{500q - 400q + 57500}} \right) = 0, \text{ daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} \frac{75}{2\sqrt{47000 - 150q}} = \frac{125}{2\sqrt{47000 + 250q}}, \text{ daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ \frac{75}{\sqrt{57500 - 300q}} = \frac{25}{\sqrt{57500 + 100q}}, \text{ daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} \frac{3}{\sqrt{47000 - 150q}} = \frac{5}{\sqrt{47000 + 250q}}, \text{ daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ \frac{3}{\sqrt{57500 - 300q}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{57500 + 100q}}, \text{ daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} 9(47000 + 250q) = 25(47000 - 150q), \text{ daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ 9(57500 + 100q) = 57500 - 300q, \text{ daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} q \cong 125.3, \text{ daca } 0 \leq q \leq 70 \\ q \cong -383.3, \text{ daca } 70 < q \leq 150 \end{cases}$$

both branches being impossible.

As a conclusion, the firm can not offer a production under the conditions from the c), meaning that  $q^{**} = 0$ ; this implies that the random payoff will actually be a loss of 3000 euro with the probability of  $\frac{1}{2}$  both at the price  $\underline{p}$ , as at the price  $\bar{p}$ .

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c) The optimum problem in this case is:

$$\begin{aligned} [\max] EU(\tilde{\Pi} + w_0) &= EU(\tilde{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0) = \\ &= \frac{1}{2}U(\underline{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0) + \frac{1}{2}U(\bar{p}q - C(q) - CF + w_0) = \\ &= \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{100q - C(q) + 47000} + \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{500q - C(q) + 47000} \end{aligned}$$

Applying the first order condition we get:

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{100 - C'(q)}{2\sqrt{100q - C(q) + 47000}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{500 - C'(q)}{2\sqrt{500q - C(q) + 47000}} \right) = 0$$

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